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A LEGISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
OF EVIDENCE CODIFICATION: WHY MOST
RULES OF EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT
BE CODIFIED-BUT PRIVILEGE
LAW SHOULD BE
Paul F. Kirgis*
I. INTRODUCTION
After a long and tortuous history, the movement to codify the
law of evidence has both succeeded and stagnated. The Federal
Rules of Evidence are now firmly established. They are an accepted
and integral part of federal practice, and most states have adopted
evidence codes based on them.' Even the Uniform Rules have been
amended, in most respects, to replicate the Federal Rules. 2 On the
other hand, the states that have not adopted versions of the Federal
Rules have largely abandoned efforts to do so.3 Moreover, although
an Advisory Committee exists to tweak the Federal Rules, it seems
disinclined to push for any significant changes.4 In short, broad
changes to the basic structure of evidence law, by way of revision,
retraction, or expansion of the current Rules, seem unlikely at best.
Furthermore, public choice theory teaches that legislation is
Professor, St. John's University School of Law; Visiting Professor,
William & Mary School of Law, Fall 2004.
1. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The
Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 293, 293 (1990).
2. Id. at 298.
3. Id. at 293 (noting that thirty-four states have codified a version of the
Federal Rules, three have considered and rejected proposed codifications based
on the Federal Rules, and ten have not seriously considered adopting a code
based on the Federal Rules).
4. See Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Tending to the Past and Pretending for the Future?, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 817, 819-23 (2002).
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frequently the product of interest-group manipulation. 5 The Federal
Rules of Evidence have sometimes appeared to be a laboratory for
testing and proving that theory. At their inception, the Rules almost
foundered amid the political wrangling over the proposed privilege
rules. 6 More recently, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Evidence has devoted considerable time and effort to fending off
ill-considered Congressional amendments to the Rules, many of
which represent blatant pandering to powerful constituencies. 7
Given this combination of legislative inertia punctuated by
interest-group maneuvering, academic efforts to change the basic
rules of evidence through the invocation of either theory or policy
norms can seem hopelessly naive. The Rules are entrenched, and if
an attempt at fundamental change ever made headway, the resulting
law would almost certainly reflect further interest-group wrangling.
That is a disheartening thought, and one that might easily lead
evidence scholars to focus on easier targets: the courts. Not
surprisingly, much evidence scholarship addresses issues that the
courts can resolve, such as the proper way to assess expert
testimony8 or the intersection of the confrontation clause and the
hearsay rule.
9
The law of evidence, however, like most areas of law in this age
of statutes,' 0 is now primarily a legislative creature. The federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, interpret the Federal Rules as a
5. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873, 875-83 (1987) (discussing conceptions of
legislation in public choice theory).
6. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-
Testimonial Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
769, 769 (2002).
7. See Symposium, The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 733, 742 (2002) (comments of Paul Rice).
8. See, e.g., Expert Admissibility Symposium, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 1
(2003).
9. See, e.g., Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the
Hearsay Rule: The Current State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick
Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REv. 763 (2000); Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEo. L.J. 1011 (1998);
Myrna S. Raeder, Hot Topics in Confrontation Clause Cases and Creating a
More Workable Confrontation Clause Framework Without Starting Over, 21
QuImNPIAc L. REv. 1013 (2003).
10. See GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1
(1982).
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statute;" they do not believe they are empowered to depart from the
text of the Rules. 12  The Advisory Committee, itself a judicial
creation, is empowered to suggest changes to the basic rules, but has
declined to do so. 3 State courts seem to have followed the federal
model in hewing to the text of their respective codes of evidence,
most of which are legislatively prescribed. 14 The reality is that if
significant change in the law of evidence is to come, it will have to
originate in the offices of legislators. So if evidence scholars
abandon efforts to speak truth to the legislative power, they abandon
most of the field of evidence.
As this symposium suggests, evidence scholars have not
completely abandoned the field. Led by some of the participants in
this symposium, scholars have debated questions such as whether the
Rules constitute a statute,' 5 and if so, how they should be
construed, 16 and whether the Advisory Committee should take a
more proactive role in promoting evidence reform. 17 The topic of
this symposium-whether privilege law should be codified-remains
11. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)
(describing Federal Rules of Evidence as a "legislative enactment" to be
interpreted according to "traditional tools of statutory construction" (quoting
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987))).
12. See Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1311-18 (1992).
13. See Rice, supra note 4.
14. There is relatively little literature which studies state courts'
interpretations of their evidence rules. One example is Robert G. Lawson,
Interpretation of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence-What Happened to the
Common Law?, 87 KY. L.J. 517 (1999), which tentatively concludes that
Kentucky courts have construed Kentucky rules of evidence to supersede
common law. See id. at 573-75. An outlier state is Ohio, which codified a
modified version of Rule 102 designed to ensure that its courts do not deviate
from the common law as codified in the state rules. See Michael Lepp &
Christopher B. McNeil, The Trial Judge as Gatekeeper for Scientific Evidence:
Will Ohio Rule of Evidence 102 Frustrate the Ohio Courts' Role Under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow?, 27 AKRON L. REV. 89, 103 (1993).
15. See Glen Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of Evidence a Statute?,
55 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1994).
16. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand
Theories of Statutory Construction: A "Bottom Up" Interpretive Approach to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REv. 389 (1996); Eileen Scallen,
Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U.
L. REv. 1717 (1995).
17. See Rice, supra note 4.
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a hot-button issue three decades after the proposed inclusion of
privilege rules nearly scuttled the entire codification project. 18
The topic of privilege codification presents an opportunity to
revisit the subject of evidence codification more generally-to
rethink assumptions about evidence codification even while
recognizing the implausibility of radical change. Whether privilege
law is codified, and what form a codification will take, will depend
on the usual Congressional machinations. But whether a proposed
codification has widespread support in the legal community-
academic or otherwise-will depend on the perceived benefits of
codification as compared with the status quo, or other options.
In this article, I will suggest standards for use in assessing a
proposed codification. Although the standards I will identify are
useful for evaluating a proposed codification of privilege law, they
are also more generally applicable. Indeed, I will use them to
examine the codification of evidence law in general. First, I will ask
whether, as a normative matter, the law of evidence should be
codified. I will then focus on the individual rules of evidence, most
notably the privilege rules, to draw conclusions about whether those
standards are met.
I address the topic of codification from a particular
legisprudential perspective. I take as my premise that, in our system
rooted in the common law, legislation must be justified in relation to
its effect on the common law. Relying on Hayek, Calabresi, and
other scholars, I will argue that legislation is justified when it serves
one of two functions: an 'ordering" function, directed at ensuring
the efficiency and fairness of existing common-law rules; and a
"remedial" function, directed at correcting errors in the common law.
I will analyze the rules of evidence-both the codified rules and the
uncodified rules of privilege-to assess whether codification is
justified according to my criteria. I will conclude that most rules of
evidence do not meet the criteria for codification, but that the law of
privilege does.
My practical objectives are two-fold. First, as I suggested, I
hope to bolster the case for the codification of privilege by showing
why it, more than almost any other area of evidence law, satisfies the
standards for codification. Second, while I acknowledge that repeal
18. See Broun, supra note 6, at 769.
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of the various evidence codes is unlikely and might not even be
justified by the cost, I hope to sound a cautionary note about further
codification efforts. With some important exceptions, most notably
the law of hearsay, the current rules of evidence are vague enough to
allow for development of the law through case-law evolution. For
that evolution to occur, though, two conditions must be satisfied. We
must leave the rules essentially as they are, without attempting to
"fix" minor problems of application that might arise. And the courts,
including the Supreme Court, must take seriously Rule 102's
command to interpret the Rules so as to secure the " romotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence."' I hope to
encourage both of those developments by suggesting reasons why
case-law evolution is generally superior to codification in the
evidence context.
I begin in Part II with a critique of traditional arguments about
the value of evidence codification. I show why those arguments do
not provide adequate support for the codification of evidence law. In
Part III, I offer a set of standards for use in evaluating codes. I argue
that American codes are simply legislation and that the provisions of
a code must be justified in relation to the common law. I explain the
"ordering" and "remedial" functions and how legislation can satisfy
them. Finally, in Part IV, I evaluate the rules of evidence according
to those standards to reach my conclusions about which rules should
be codified and which should not.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS
FOR CODIFICATION
Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans engaged in a
protracted national debate about the relative merits of the common
law and of codes.20 The debate seems to have begun about the time
that Jeremy Bentham wrote to President James Madison in 1811,
19. FED. R. EvID. 102. For a debate about the role of Rule 102 and court
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, compare Glen Weissenberger,
Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1565-67
(1999) with Edward J. Imwinkelried, Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence
Should Be Conceived as a Perpetual Index Code: Blindness Is Worse Than
Myopia, 40 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1595, 1605-12 (1999).
20. See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT 98
(1981).
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beneficently offering to draft a code to remove "the yoke of...
wordless, as well as boundless, and shapeless shape of common,
alias Unwritten law" from about the necks of the young American
states.2 1 Bentham favored a comprehensive code in the mold of the
Napoleonic Code, one that would entirely supplant the common
law.2 Code proponents who followed him varied in their devotion
to the comprehensive model.2 3 But the most prominent among them,
David Dudley Field, was also one of the strongest supporters of
comprehensive codification.24 In addition to his codes of civil and
criminal procedure adopted in the .early 1850s, Field and his
commission produced codes between 1859 and 1865 purporting to
cover the whole of public law (the Political Code), criminal law (the
Penal Code), and private civil law (the Civil Code).25
Field's codes were widely debated and were adopted almost
whole in the Dakota and Montana Territories and, more importantly,
in California. 26  By that time, extensive codes had already been
adopted in Georgia and Louisiana.27 Eventually, Field's Penal Code
and part of his Political Code were adopted in modified form in New
York.28 But the movement for comprehensive codification to
supplant the common law ultimately failed.29 A number of reasons
seem to account for that. First, while Americans were disenchanted
with the English political system, in general they respected the
common law. Many Americans believed that Parliament and the
Crown denied them the rights that should have been guaranteed to
them by the common law.30 Second, the French Civil Code appeared
on the scene in 1804, too late to be incorporated into the first laws of
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The Massachusetts commission on codification led by Justice Joseph
Story, for example, concluded that codification was both possible and desirable
in only certain areas of the law. See Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and
Right Answers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 355, 360-61 (1999).
24. Id. at 361.
25. See COOK, supra note 20, at 196.
26. See Morriss, supra note 23, at 356.
27. See COOK, supra note 20, at 57, 198
28. See Morriss, supra note 23, at 356, 364-66.
29. See id. at 356.
30. See COOK, supra note 20, at 4.
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the new states.3 1 Whatever the reasons, by the end of the century, the
momentum behind Field's codes had died and no voice for
codification of comparable stature and influence emerged.32
For nineteenth-century proponents of comprehensive
codification, the philosophical justification for codification was
political. Codifiers were skeptical of a common law formulated and
guarded by an elite, unaccountable judiciary and accessible only to
professional lawyers.33  They saw codification as a route to
democratization of the law.34  Codification, in their view, would
simultaneously transfer law-making power from the judges to the
elected legislatures and make the law available to untrained
laypersons. 
3 5
In the twentieth century, as the movement for comprehensive
codification faded, the philosophical arguments for selective
codification turned utilitarian. Proponents of codification
emphasized more prosaic benefits tied to the functional deficiencies
of the common law. For example, in his 1946 multi-part tome on the
sources of law, Roscoe Pound identified five defects in the common
law: want of certainty, inefficiency, lack of knowledge of the law on
the part of legislators, irrationality, and confusion.36 He predicted
that these defects would ultimately lead to widespread codification.
37
Similarly, continental lawyers evaluating the common law system
advocated the ability of a code system to improve predictability and
31. In 1808, however, Louisiana, a state with powerful French cultural
influences, did adopt a code based on the Code Napoleon. R. Lee Warthen,
The Non-Emergence of the Anglo-American Law Code, LEGAL REFERENCE
SERVICES Q., Spring/Summer 1986, at 129, 148.
32. See Morriss, supra note 23, at 358-60.
33. See id. at 370-74 (describing nineteenth century arguments in favor of
codification).
34. See Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law? Recent
American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's
Subsequent Development, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1119, 1122-23 ("[P]roponents
[of codification] argued that allowing unelected judges to make law was
inconsistent with democracy, and, therefore, codification was a necessary
bulwark against what amounted to illegitimate judicial legislation.").
35. See Morriss, supra note 23, at 371-74.
36. Roscoe Pound, Sources and Forms of Law JY." Codification, 22 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 46, 77-78 (1946).
37. Id. at 76.
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coherence in the law.38 These arguments carried the day in helping
garner widespread acceptance of the Uniform Commercial Code,
3W
the Model Penal Code,40 and other codification efforts. 4 1 Where
comprehensive codification, with its broad rejection of the common
law, had foundered, partial codification of specific doctrinal areas of
the law succeeded.
For the law of evidence, a similar progression occurred, though
over a longer period of years. Field had included sections dealing
with the law of evidence in his draft codes.42 But those sections were
rejected in New York and other states even as his Code of Civil
Procedure was widely accepted.43 Thereafter, efforts to codify the
law of evidence lay dormant for several decades. When the evidence
codification movement began again in earnest in the twentieth
century, the arguments for evidence codification echoed the
arguments for codification more generally in emphasizing practical
benefits. In its 1960 report on the advisability of promulgating rules
of evidence, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States focused on the need for
a uniform system of evidence law to replace the patchwork of federal
and state laws then in effect and on the potential for codification to
38. See G. de Grooth, Codification and Case Law, 3 KAN. L. REv. 333,
335, 341 (1955); see also Warthen, supra note 31, at 133-34 (explaining that
later codification movements intended codes "to provide a harmonious meeting
of practice and doctrine, to replace judicial discretion with legislative control,
and to simplify and clarify the language of law so that even the common
person could understand it").
39. See UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, 1 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2004) (listing
jurisdictions adopting the U.C.C.).
40. See Gerard E. Lynch, Towards A Model Penal Code, Second
(Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 297, 297
(1998) (noting that within two decades after its publication, the Model Penal
Code had served as the basis for new codifications of criminal law in more
than two-thirds of the states).
41. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 2004) (listing adopting
jurisdictions); UNiF. ARBITRATION AT, 7 U.L.A. 60 (Supp. 2004) (listing
adopting jurisdictions); UNEF. PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2004) (listing
adopting jurisdictions).
42. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Quality of Practice in Federal Courts, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 173, 177 (1978).
43. Id.
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improve the law of evidence.44  Most of the scholarly literature
discussing the history of the Federal Rules of Evidence also stresses
those dual objectives of uniformity and improvement of the law of
evidence.45 Ultimately, those arguments prevailed. After a series of
failed codification efforts, 4 6 a successful codification of evidence
finally took hold with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and their subsequent dissemination among the states.47
The utilitarian objectives of uniformity and improvement of the
law may make sense as justifications for codification in many areas
historically reserved for the common law. But for a number of
reasons, they do not make sense as justifications for a broad
codification of evidence law. I explain those reasons in this section,
as a prelude to offering an alternative standard for assessing the
utility of codification in the next section.
44. See Thomas F. Green, Jr., A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and
Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 98 (1962).
45. See Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and
Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 260 (1984).
Professor Berger, assessing the rules a decade after their promulgation, pointed
to three primary benefits that proponents attributed to codification: uniformity,
improvement in the quality of the bench and bar, and flexibility in decision
making. Id. Professor Steven Saltzburg described these perceived benefits of
adopting uniform rules of evidence for the federal courts:
[L]awyers would have an easier time in dealing with a set of rules
rather than attempting to order all existing common law
authorities;... the states might begin to improve the condition of their
laws of evidence; and lawyers and judges who tried federal cases in
more than one state would not have to be familiar with the
multifarious evidence rules found in the several states.
Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 181; see also Kenneth Williams, Do We Really
Need the FederalRules of Evidence?, 74 N.D. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1998).
46. The first significant twentieth century codification effort, Dean
Wigmore's mammoth code of evidence, was never even seriously considered
for adoption anywhere. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §1.2, at 4 (3rd ed. 2003). The Model Code of
Evidence, proposed by the American Law Institute in 1947, was taken more
seriously, but was never adopted in any jurisdiction. See id. Compared with
those earlier efforts, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1953, were
a relative success; they were adopted in three states, the Virgin Islands, and the
Canal Zone. See id. at 4 & n.6.
47. See id. at 4 & n.2 (noting that, as of 2002, forty-two states had adopted
codes based on the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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A. Uniformity
With the national rejection of comprehensive codification in the
nineteenth century, uniformity was also rejected as an overarching
value. The decision to retain a common-law system entailed a
decision to embrace a multiplicity of legal standards over a set of
uniform standards. Consequently, for uniformity to provide a
rationale for codifying any particular area of the law, some definable
benefit must flow from the realization of uniformity in that area.
Proponents of evidence codification have identified three benefits
flowing from uniformity: efficiency gains to attorneys from having
only one body of law to learn;48 procedural justice for litigants who
should be able to expect the same law to apply in different courts;
49
and predictability in areas of legal uncertainty. I consider them in
turn.
1. Does Uniformity Promote Efficiency Across Jurisdictions?
In an area such as commercial law, obvious and substantial
efficiency gains can be realized by increasing uniformity among
different jurisdictions. For example, a lender may take a security
interest in the property of a commercial actor-a retailer, for
instance-conducting business operations in many states. To the
extent the laws of those states differ in matters such as the types of
property in which security interests may be taken or in the
procedures for perfecting security interests, the complexity, and
hence the costs, of the transaction increase.51 Making the laws of the
various states uniform, as the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
did, will unquestionably reduce costs and increase efficiency.
In contrast, in the law of evidence, the efficiency gains from
increased uniformity are much harder to see. Trial attorneys do not
sell a one-size-fits-all product the way merchants, issuers of
commercial paper, and secured creditors do. They prepare each case
individually, working with the evidence that is available to them
given the facts of that case. Differences among courts regarding the
48. See Green, supra note 44, at 109-10.
49. See Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 189.
50. See Berger, supra note 45, at 264-65.
51. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, 1 SECuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 15.2, at 466-71 (1965) (describing different regimes for perfection
of security interests by filing prior to the adoption of U.C.C. Article 9).
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admissibility of evidence may affect the choices attorneys make
about the uses of evidence, but the mere fact that different rules
apply will not make litigation in general more expensive. There may
be some cost associated with determining the governing rules, but
that cost will be relatively minor. In any event, because of the laws
limiting the courts before which attorneys can appear, most attorneys
appear before a handful of courts, for which they can easily master
the governing rules-assuming the governing rules are sufficiently
clear.
In any area of the law, promoting national uniformity has a
superficial appeal. Academics in common-law systems tend to be
slightly embarrassed by the prospect of contradictory legal rules
within what is ostensibly a single legal regime. Again, however, we
have made a national decision to accept the occasional incoherence
of a common-law system. Cogency alone is not a good enough
reason to codify. Efficiency might be; but in the realm of evidence
law, the efficiency gains have not been demonstrated.
2. Does Uniformity Enhance Procedural Justice?
The most articulate proponent of the procedural justice rationale
for evidence codification is Professor Steven Saltzburg. He has
described the "system" of evidence law prior to the passage of the
rules in these terms:
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
every practicing lawyer knew that when he or she walked
into a courtroom,.... that judge's own set of evidence rules
was likely to be employed .... Trial judges often
established rules of thumb for their courts because they had
no other rules to guide them. When it came to evidence
rulings, appellate courts did little to minimize the impact of
the idiosyncrasies of a trial judge. In some jurisdictions
there were probably almost as many sets of evidence rules
as trial judges.
52
Professor Saltzburg concluded that "[t]here is something terribly
wrong with a single system that allows cases to be tried differently in
different courtrooms, so that different rules govern the way in which
the evidence that is necessary to resolve the case will be
52. Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 189.
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presented.''53  He extolled the Federal Rules for rectifying this
problem.
54
It seems beyond debate that all litigants in a single system
should be subject to the same rules of evidence. But it does not
necessarily follow that those rules must be in the form of a code.
The chaos reigning in the federal courts prior to the rules resulted
from the absence in federal law of any clear statement of the source
of the governing evidentiary standards. As of the 1960s, different
and deliberately vague rules applied in criminal and civil cases in
federal court.55 In civil cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a)
provided:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under
the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of
evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United
States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the
state in which the United States court is held.56
The rule provided this helpful tiebreaker: "In any case, the statute or
rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the
evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient method
prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein
made."
57
The rule in criminal cases, governed by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26, was a little more straightforward, though not
necessarily more instructive:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and
privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an
act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. 58
53. Id.
54. Id. at 190.
55. For example, admiralty courts had their own set of procedural rules and
typically followed a general common law of evidence, except in prize cases.
See Green, supra note 44, at 93.
56. See id. at 90.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 92.
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This language, of course, remains with us today in Federal Rule of
Evidence 501.59
Given these commands as to the sources of evidence law, it is no
surprise that the situation evolved as described by Professor
Saltzburg. 60 Judges in civil cases had license to use virtually any
rules they chose, bounded only by their own conceptions of
convenience. 6 1 Judges in criminal cases were directed to follow the
common law, but were given no instruction as to which sources of
common law should be considered authoritative and were given
leave to depart from common-law precedent as needed "in light of
reason and experience."
62
Adopting a federal code of evidence was certainly one way to
deal with the confusion and inconsistency engendered by those rules.
But other options existed. Most obviously, the rules could have been
amended to direct federal courts to follow the rules of evidence
applicable in state courts in the states in which the federal courts
sit.63  In terms of procedural justice, this solution has obvious
advantages over the promulgation of uniform rules for federal courts.
It seems a much greater injustice for two similarly situated litigants
in the same state to face different courtroom procedures than for two
similarly situated litigants in different states to face different
courtroom procedures. Adopting uniform rules of evidence for
federal courts addresses the latter concern, but not the former.
Of course, in any state that has adopted a version of the federal
rules as its state code of evidence, the former concern is also
addressed. Given that forty-two out of fifty states have adopted a
version of the federal rules, concerns about intrastate uniformity
seem, at first blush, to be moot.64 But it is a bit misleading to simply
count the states that have adopted codes like the federal rules,
because many of the most populous states-including California,
59. FED. R. EvIm. 501 ("[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience.").
60. Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 175-83, 189.
61. See Green, supra note 44, at 83-84.
62. See id. at 85.
63. See Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence: New Perspectives, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 594, 605, 625-28 (1974).
64. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 1.2, at 4 n.2.
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New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Missouri--do not
fall into that category. 65 As a result, roughly one-third of the nation's
population lives in states that have not adopted a version of the
federal rules.6 6  Therefore, intrastate non-uniformity is still a
significant concern.
The primary argument against incorporation of state law through
an enforced intrastate uniformity is that it would leave federal judges
67without clear guidance as to what the governing rules are. State
law might be equally as chaotic as federal law had been. Federal
judges would struggle with whether they were required to follow the
decisions of lower state courts and with what to do when there was
no state court decision on point.
68
But these concerns frequently arise in federal court diversity
actions in which state law supplies the rule of decision. Federal
courts applying the Erie doctrine69 already engage in educated
guesses about ambiguous state law.70  They manage. As for the
argument that state law may be in as bad or worse condition as pre-
Rules federal law, the states have just as much incentive as the
federal government to ensure clear and workable rules of
adjudicative procedure. 71 Moreover, the states that have not adopted
the federal rules of evidence do not seem to be in crisis about the
condition of their laws of evidence. California has its own code,
which is entrenched and widely accepted.72 New York73 and
65. See id. The other states are Georgia and Kansas. See id.
66. For current population estimates, see the U.S. Census Bureau's website,
http://www.census.gov/.
67. See Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 192-93.
68. See Green, supra note 44, at 96-97 (referring to questions arising under
the pre-Rules version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a)).
69. The doctrine gets its name from Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), which held that a federal court must follow state substantive law when
sitting in diversity. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 218-19
(3d ed. 1999).
70. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 69, at 224-29 (describing federal
court strategies for determining content of state law).
71. See Weinberg, supra note 63, at 627-28.
72. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 1.2, at 4.
73. See generally Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That Is
the Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58
BROOK. L. REv. 641 (1992) (examining New York's efforts to adopt a version
of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
A LEGISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
Massachusetts 74 have recently considered and rejected proposals to
adopt versions of the Federal Rules, concluding that their own
common laws of evidence are functioning at least as well.
Procedural justice is an important goal. Uniformity is an aspect
of procedural justice. But the most important type of uniformity for
procedural justice is uniformity among courts within a single state.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not accomplish that goal, at least
not directly or completely. More clear guidance on the sources of
common law by which federal courts should abide could achieve
equivalent gains in procedural justice without sacrificing the
flexibility of the common law.
3. Does Uniformity Produce Efficiency Gains by Increasing
Predictability and Certainty?
Uniformity increases predictability and certainty across
jurisdictions because it allows legal actors to predict that the law
applied in one jurisdiction will be substantially the same as the law
applied in another jurisdiction. For the reasons described above, I
am not convinced of the efficiency gains from that kind of
predictability when applied to evidence law. Scholars have also
discussed uniformity as promoting predictability and certainty within
a single jurisdiction. 75  Predictability and certainty do promote
efficiency in that context, although the uniformity created by the
Federal Rules of Evidence is largely irrelevant in achieving those
benefits.
In its 1962 preliminary report on the advisability of
promulgating uniform federal rules of evidence, the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Judicial Conference
lamented the "spawning mass of rulings and statutes which tend
increasingly to clog trial machinery." 76 The Committee concluded
that "[u]niformity and simplicity are the only cure."77 Similarly, in
discussing uniformity as an advantage of evidence codification,
Professor Margaret Berger argued that the resolution of uncertain
evidentiary issues "in a non-uniform manner forces counsel to learn
74. See R. MARC KANTROWlTZ, MASSACHUSETrs EVIDENCE FROM A TO Z
(2003).
75. See Berger, supra note 45, at 264.
76. Green, supra note 44, at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
Winter 20041
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:809
different rules for different judges, and to raise numerous procedural
issues on appeal., 78  The uniformity that the Committee and
Professor Berger extol is a uniformity in the law applicable in a
given jurisdiction. Again, efficiency is the underlying value. The
idea is that judges and litigants should know with a fair degree of
certainty what rules of evidence will govern the particular case at
bar, so that the trial judge is sufficiently guided and so that appeals
are less frequent.
79
This uncertainty is a genuine concern, although it seems
misleading to talk about it as a problem of uniformity. The real
problem here is lack of certainty in the law. This is a problem that
exists independently of whether the law should be the same in
different jurisdictions. If the law is uncertain in any particular court
system, individuals acting in the shadow of the law in that
jurisdiction will not be able to predict which behaviors will be met
with judicial approval and which will be met with judicial reproach.
They will, as a consequence, resort to the judicial machinery more
frequently in order to get answers to those questions. This will, in
turn, increase social costs.
The extent of the cost, however, depends on the availability and
expense involved in resorting to the judicial decision-making
machinery. In the commercial context, the cost is high because
resort to the judicial machinery involves commencing a law suit.
That is why arbitrary rules like the "mailbox rule" and the "perfect
tender rule" make sense in the law of contracts. An unambiguous
rule addressing a common source of dispute reduces the incidence of
expensive litigation, lowers transaction costs, and makes transactions
more efficient.
For most rules of evidence, in contrast, the judicial decision-
making machinery is right at hand. The parties are already in
litigation, and in fact are frequently standing in front of a judge when
the evidentiary issue arises. Of course, as Professor Berger points
out, there is the potential for increased appellate litigation where the
rules enforced by the trial judge are uncertain.80 But that cost is also
relatively minor. First, litigants normally do not appeal if the only
78. Berger, supra note 45, at 269.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 259.
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issue is the interpretation of an uncertain rule of evidence. 81 The
deference that appellate courts afford trial judges on evidentiary
issues makes such single-issue appeals imprudent. 82 Where, as more
commonly occurs, an evidentiary issue is raised as one of several
issues on appeal, the additional cost to decide the evidentiary issue is
negligible.
Furthermore, for any single issue, the cost of appellate litigation
will be finite, because the consequence of appellate litigation is an
increase in certainty. The first few litigants to appeal an issue will
bear some cost, but usually those appeals will produce a more or less
certain decision on the issue. Issues that are not subject to resolution
through the appellate process probably are not subject to resolution
through the legislative process either. The law on the admissibility
of prior acts is a good example. The issue is highly fact-sensitive, so
it continues to come up in different forms on appeal.83 The
"codification" of this area in Rule 404(b) simply has not made much
difference. 84  The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence cannot address the infinite variety of prior acts issues any
better than the courts can.
To be sure, there are issues that are considered part of the body
of evidence law that demand certainty. These are the parts of
evidence law that implicate what is sometimes referred to as
"primary conduct"-that is, activity not related to the trial process.
Whenever rules have to be interpreted at a remove from the point of
enforcement, efficiency gains will result to the extent the rules are
made more certain. So where real-world behavior is affected by the
possibility of evidentiary admissibility, the rules should be as certain
as possible and codification may be warranted. Notably, privilege is
the area of evidence law that most implicates this principle. For
81. See Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error
Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 893, 893 n.2 (1992).
82. Id. at 894 ("Although more than twenty thousand cases a year were
tried in the federal courts in the twenty-four month period between July 1,
1988 and June 30, 1990, I could find only thirty cases decided in 1990 in
which a court of appeals stated in an officially reported opinion that its reversal
was due to an evidentiary error at trial.").
83. See M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices Other Crimes, 41
IOWA L. REv. 325 (1956).
84. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's notes on December 1991
amendment.
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privilege law to have its desired effect, the people in a position to
invoke a privilege must know what kinds of conduct will receive
protection. Yet privilege is the one area of evidence law that has not
been made certain through codification.
I will return to these points in Part IV below in applying my
proposed standard for codification to the law of evidence.
B. Improvement in the Law and Legal Practice
The argument that the Federal Rules of Evidence improve the
law and legal practice takes several different forms. At the most
basic level, it is argued that the rules and standards incorporated in
the Federal Rules improve substantively on prior law, mainly by
relaxing stringent exclusionary rules.8 5 Another claim is that the
existence of clear and uniform rules puts pressure on trial judges to
make better-reasoned decisions, since they can no longer hide behind
a morass of ambiguous and confusing decisional law.86 Finally,
some contend that the rules provide a valuable function as an
evidentiary "pocket bible," making available a handy reference for
trial objections and rulings.
8 7
1. Do the Rules Improve Substantively on Prior Law?
The argument that the Federal Rules of Evidence mark a clear
improvement over prior law is not objectively provable. To a large
degree, the beauty of evidentiary rules lies in the beholder. But the
rules certainly have liberalized a number of common-law rules that
seemed to limit unnecessarily the admissibility of useful evidence. It
never made sense to bar opinions on the "ultimate issue," to give one
example, and it was an advance for Rule 704 to do away with that
restriction.88 One wonders, though, whether the same liberalizing
results could not have been achieved by leaving the common law
intact and advocating change by way of a Restatement of the law of
evidence. That approach has, after all, worked fairly well to bring
85. See Berger, supra note 45, at 269-70.
86. See Williams, supra note 45, at 5-6; Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 191.
87. See Williams, supra note 45, at 6.
88. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 7.12, at 636-37
(describing problems with pre-rules objections to opinion evidence on the
ultimate issue); see FED. R. EvID. 704 ("[T]estimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.").
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fields such as the law of torts up to date.
89
Even conceding its liberalizing benefits, codification has
probably imposed a cost in the reification of law. As codifications
go, the Federal Rules are much less detailed than most. Many of the
provisions set out general standards rather than specific rules.
Because of that structure, judges can exercise wide discretion while
still nominally acting within the scope of the rules. In many cases,
however, judges have simply decided cases in ways that contradict
the plain text of the Rules.90 So the Federal Rules probably present
less risk of reification than other codes. Nonetheless, in several areas
codification has served to cement evidentiary doctrines that make
little sense.
The hearsay rules are a good example of this danger. The
Federal Rules of Evidence contain seven rules dealing with hearsay,
with almost 50 subparts.91 There are eight hearsay exclusions and 28
specific hearsay "exceptions," plus an amorphous and mostly
misused residual exception.92 Where the common law of hearsay
had been imprecise and thus highly elastic, the Federal Rules provide
a wealth of detailed guidance on the admissibility of out-of-court
statements. Eddie Morgan's goal of eliminating the use of res gestae
in evidence discourse has largely been achieved through the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 93 But it is not clear whether that represents a
success for evidence law or a failure. Ambiguity can be an avenue
toward advancement in the law. Several evidence scholars have
persuasively argued that concerns about out-of-court statements
should be addressed by a flexible "best evidence" principle that
recognizes both the value and the risks of different types of
89. See Richard H. Gibson, Credit Card Dischargeability: Two Cheers for
the Common Law and Some Modest Proposal for Legislative Reform, 74 AM.
BANKR. L. 129, 135 (2000) (explaining that the Supreme Court has relied upon
the Restatement (Second) of Torts "as the definitive source of common law
fraud").
90. See Daniel J. Capra, Case Law Divergence from the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 197 F.R.D. 531 (2000).
91. FED. R. EVID. 801-807.
92. FED. R. EVID. 803-804, 807.
93. EDMUND MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 328-77 (1961).
But see, e.g., People v. Coney, 98 P.3d 930 (Colo. App. 2004) (allowing
evidence of defendant's other drug arrests as res gestae).
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hearsay. 94  If we did not have Rules 801 through 805, with their
many rigid subparts and exceptions to contend with, we might more
quickly realize that objective.
Perhaps more significantly, the most important advancements in
evidence law since the adoption of the Federal Rules have come not
from the codifiers, but from the courts. The most prominent example
is the law governing expert testimony. The original version of the
federal rules gave trial judges only the vaguest guidance on the
issue,95 and many judges interpreted the lack of guidance as license
to admit virtually any evidence colorably described as "expert."
96
Eventually, the Supreme Court stepped in. With its decisions in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,97 General Electric
Co. v. Joiner,98 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,99 the Court
resolved inconsistencies among the circuits and established a
comprehensible and workable framework for ensuring the reliability
of expert testimony. Only then did the Advisory Committee take
action, amending Rule 702 to add three standards for courts to use in
assessing expert reliability. 0 0 And the standards the Committee
inserted are so general that they seem to add little or nothing to the
94. See Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best
Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REv. 893 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein,
Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331 (1960); George F. James,
The Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REv. 788
(1940).
95. The original version of Rule 702 provided that "[i]f scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." See FED. R. EVID. 702; id. advisory
committee's notes. The rule left it entirely to the judge to decide whether
evidence was sufficiently "scientific" and whether it would "assist" the trier of
fact.
96. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 2-4 (1993) (describing proliferation of "junk science" in
courtrooms as a result of loose standards for scientific evidence).
97. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that scientific evidence must be both
reliable and relevant, but refusing to endorse traditional Frye test).
98. 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that the abuse of discretion standard
applies to appellate review of trial court's rulings applying Daubert).
99. 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (applying Daubert standards to all expert
testimony).
100. See FED. R. EviD. 702 (advisory committee's notes).
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Supreme Court's holdings. 
101
This sequence of events shows not only how the process of
common-law development can work in the law of evidence, but also
how fruitless codification efforts frequently are. When code
language is specific, as it is in the hearsay rules, it hamstrings
common-law development and reifies the law. On the other hand,
when code language is general and framed as standards rather than
definite rules, as in Rule 702, it frequently adds little or nothing to
the law established through common-law precedent.
This, then, is the reason to be cautious in praising the Rules as
an instrument of reform and improvement in evidence law. Because
of codification, the liberalization of the law of evidence happened
much more quickly than it would have if left in the hands of the
courts. Once promulgated, though, codes can act as a drag on further
development of the law. The Federal Rules of Evidence may have
been a drag on the development of the law in at least some important
areas. With some exceptions, the Advisory Committee has not
shown the ability to identify and act upon areas of the law in need of
transformation. It has devoted much of its energies simply to
correcting drafting problems. 10 2 In the long run, the common-law
process might lead to more effective development of the law.
2. Have the Rules Improved the Quality of Judging
and Lawyering?
It seems likely that the Federal Rules of Evidence have
101. But see UNIF. R. EvID. §702 (1999), 13A U.L.A. 140 (1999). In most
instances, the revised Uniform Rules of Evidence track the language of the
Federal Rules. The revised version of Uniform Rule of Evidence 702,
however, provides additional detail, including sections establishing
presumptions for and against unreliability depending on whether proffered
"expertise" would satisfy the Frye test and a section listing seven other
"reliability factors." Id. To date, no state has adopted this provision.
102. See, e.g., FED. R. Evil. 608(b). Rule 608(b) was amended as of
December 1, 2003, to correct a drafting error. The rule in its original form
referred to limitations on the use of "prior acts" evidence to prove a witness's
"credibility;" the rule was amended to make clear that it applies to such
evidence used to prove a witness's "character for truthfulness." Considerable
time and effort was expended trying to fix this "problem," which appears not
to have thrown a single court off in applying the rule. See FED. R. EVID. 608
advisory committee notes (citing several decisions correctly applying the rule
as originally intended and no decisions incorrectly applying it).
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improved the quality of trial advocacy and the quality of judicial trial
management. The rules are a concise and easily-accessible reference
source for on-the-spot evidentiary determinations. Their availability
probably makes attorneys more confident in making and responding
to objections and probably makes judges more precise and consistent
in issuing rulings. 103 The judges themselves seem to agree with that
conclusion. In an informal survey of federal district court judges
conducted by Professor Kenneth Williams, thirty-six out of the forty-
five judges he surveyed said that the rules make their lives easier,
and twenty-five out of forty-five said that the rules have improved
the quality of lawyering. 14
This argument cannot provide the only or even the primary
rationale for codification, however. Codification does more than
simply compile the law in a handy reference source. It reifies the
law in a series of rules that the courts treat as legislative
commands.' 05 If our primary need is to make the basic principles
governing evidence law accessible, that can be accomplished through
measures short of codification. A Restatement of Evidence would do
the trick. Private treatises can also fill that role. For decades in New
York, Richardson on Evidence served the "pocket bible" function in
virtually every state court. 106 McCormick on Evidence seems to have
served a similar function in many courts around the country prior to
the adoption and dissemination of the Federal Rules.1
0 7
In sum, the traditional arguments based on uniformity and
improvement of the law, in their many variations, fall short as
justifications for evidence codification. That does not mean,
however, that no justifications exist. In the next part, I will suggest
103. See Berger, supra note 45, at 260-61 ("Because a code of evidence is
readily available, all judges and attorneys can approach an evidentiary problem
from the same starting point.").
104. See Williams, supra note 45, at 31-32. Professor Williams only
surveyed judges who had been on the bench prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 31.
105. See Weissenberger, supra note 15.
106. See W.P. RICHARDSON, OUTLINES OF EVIDENCE (1911); JEROME
PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (10th ed. 1973); RICHARD T. FARRELL,
PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (11 th ed. 1995). With the proliferation of
other evidence treatises, Richardson seems to have lost some of its cachet as
the bible of evidence in New York.
107. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (John William Strong et al. eds., 5th ed.
1999).
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justifications that might provide a better starting point for evaluating
the codification of evidence law.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LEGISLATION IN A
COMMON-LAW SYSTEM
One of the reasons that the traditional arguments in favor of
codification-and particularly in favor of evidence codification-are
not more compelling is that they try to prove too much. They focus
on the value of codification as a general principle for a given
doctrinal area. They try to answer questions about whether
codification, in general, is good for the law of commercial
transactions, or good for the law of estates, or good for the law of
evidence. This way of evaluating codification efforts makes sense
for comprehensive codes-that is, for codes that occupy an entire
field and supplant any existing law. But American codes do not fit
that model. Most scholars interested in codification contend that
American codes fit into the type labeled the "perpetual index
model."' 0 8 Unlike comprehensive codes, perpetual index codes use
the common law as a foundation and even allow the common law to
continue to develop. 10 9 In the words of Justice Story, a code of this
type "will thus become... a perpetual index to the known law,
gradually refining, enlarging and qualifying its doctrines, and, at the
same time, bringing them together in a concise and positive form for
public use."
' 10
In theory, a perpetual index code should not hamstring the
evolution of the law through the case method. Judges applying the
code should interpret it in light of common-law principles and may
even have license to depart from the code language to avoid unjust or
illogical decisions.' This freedom, incidentally, arguably was
expressly incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence in Rule
102, which provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure...
108. See Rosen, supra note 34, at 1195; Weissenberger, supra note 19, at
1559.
109. See Rosen, supra note 34, at 1131-35. For a description of three other
categories of codes, see id. at 1127-36.
110. See Joseph Story, Story's Report, in JEREMY BENTHAM ET AL.,
CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW 25, 46 (New York, John Polhemus
1882).
111. See Weissenberger, supra note 19, at 1561 n.93.
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promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence.""
' 12
In practice, however, American codes do not fit the perpetual
index model much better than they fit the comprehensive model.
Courts simply do not interpret American codes in the hermeneutic
style indicative of a true perpetual index code. Rather, they tend to
treat the codes as statutes, focusing mostly on the plain meaning,
resorting to legislative history when convenient, but generally
searching for legislative intent. 113 The Supreme Court has made this
approach express with respect to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
declaring that "[w]e interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules
of Evidence as we would any statute." 114 In the United States, as it
turns out, we do not really have codes at all, at least not in the sense
understood by traditional code advocates. We have legislation,
which can be more or less comprehensive within a doctrinal field,
engrafted onto common law.' '5
Given that paradigm, it does not make sense to evaluate a code
as a whole. A code is neither good nor bad. Instead, the individual
provisions in the code are either good or bad (or neutral) depending
on whether they meet some definable normative standard. The trick,
naturally, is to define the appropriate normative standards.
112. FED. R. EvID. 102 (emphasis added). For a cogent argument as to why
the Federal Rules of Evidence should be construed as a perpetual index code,
see Weissenberger, supra note 19. For the opposing viewpoint, see
Imwinkelried, supra note 19.
113. See Rosen, supra note 34, at 1141-60 (describing empirical study of
how judges interpret the U.C.C. and the Federal Rules of Evidence). The
author concluded that courts interpreting the codes rely overwhelmingly on the
language of the codes, rather than on either pre or post-code case law. Id. at
1160; see also Bruce W. Frier, One Hundred Years Of Uniform State Laws:
Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2201, 2210 (1991) (stating that, for the
U.C.C., "both scholarly and judicial arguments still usually begin from the
apparent meaning of the UCC's provisions, and move on to other types of
interpretation only when no satisfactory answer is obtained").
114. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). For a
list of articles analyzing the Supreme Court's approach to interpreting the
Federal Rules of Evidence, see Weissenberger, supra note 19, at 1541 n.7.
115. The arguable exception is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
have been interpreted to allow judges to continue to use their inherent
discretionary powers even in some areas specifically addressed by the rules.
See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962) (holding that
district court has inherent power to dismiss case sua sponte for failure to
prosecute even though Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41, governing
dismissals, refers only to motions by plaintiff or defendant).
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One way to think about the normative standards for evaluating
legislation is simply to ask what makes a law good. This has been
the strategy employed by the most preeminent political philosophers
in the Anglo-American tradition. Locke, in the Second Treatise of
Government, argued that the proper legislative function is to figure
out the principles of natural law and then declare them to all." 6 "The
obligations of the law of nature cease not in society," he wrote, "but
only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws
known penalties annexed to them, to enforce their observation." 7
Bentham, skeptical of both natural law and the common law,"18
assessed all "laws," whether made by judges or legislatures,
according to his test of utility."l 9 He asked whether the law increases
pleasures and prevents pains for the greatest possible number of
people. 12  Rawls emphasized the legislature's duty to do justice,
defined according to his two principles-the principle of equal
liberty and the difference principle.' 21 Legislatures, in Rawls' vision,
should act so as to ensure that all people have an equal right to
liberty and that inequal social resources are used to help the least
fortunate and are attached to positions that are open to all. 
122
Arguably, all legislation should concern itself with principles of
natural law, social utility, and justice, however those ineffable
concepts are understood. I want to suggest, however, that it must
also do more. Because ours is a common-law system, all legislation
must be assessed in light of its relationship to the common law. In
this section, I will explain why that is so and then offer some
standards for evaluating legislation in a common-law system.
A. The Place of Legislation in a Common-Law System
The rejection of comprehensive codification at the end of the
116. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 135, at 71 (C.B.
MacPherson ed. 1980).
117. Id.
118. See Warthen, supra note 31, at 142 (describing Bentham's reaction to
Blackstone's Commentaries).
119. Id.
120. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Hafner Publ'g Co. 1948) (1823) (arguing that
legislation should be based on maximizing utility).
121. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971).
122. See id.
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nineteenth century meant there would be no widespread overturning
of common law in favor of comprehensive, legislatively enacted
codes. The common law would remain the default source of private
civil law throughout the United States. 2 3 That fact in itself suggests
that those arguing for legislation in any particular doctrinal area bear
the burden of proving why legislation is justified. Given the
proliferation of statutes over the twentieth century,' 24 however, it is
probably no longer sufficient to rely on the rejection of wide-scale
codification as grounds for emphasizing the common law's primacy
over legislation. Increasingly, legislatures rather than courts are the
primary source of law.12 5 So an argument that legislation must be
justified in relation to the common-law area it impacts requires
normative support.
The most eloquent recent proponent of the common law is
Friedrich Hayek. Hayek described two possible types of social
order: spontaneous order, or kosmos, and "made" order, or taxis.
126
Order in the taxis form tends to be relatively simple, concrete (in the
sense of being readily perceived), and made to serve the purposes of
the maker. 127 Order in the kosmos form may be far more complex, is
frequently abstract (in the sense that it involves a structure of
relationships that persists even as the affected elements change over
time), and lacks a human-directed purpose.128 Law, society's method
for ordering itself, may be of either type. Common law is order in
the kosmos form; legislation is order in the taxis form.
129
For Hayek, "made" order-legislation-is inherently inferior to
the spontaneous order of the common law.' 30 Hayek was primarily
concerned with the New Dealers and later architects of the modern
welfare state. According to Hayek, they suffered under the fallacy of
123. See COOK, supra note 20, at 202-03 (explaining that ardor for
codification died in large measure because the common law successfully
adapted to the changing circumstances of the nineteenth century).
124. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977)
(describing an "orgy of statute-making" in the twentieth century).
125. CALABRESI, supra note 10.
126. 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND
ORDER 37 (1973).
127. 1 id. at 38.
128. 1 id. at 38-39.
129. lid. at 45-46.
130. See I id. at 35-54.
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"constructivism"-the hubristic belief "that all the relevant facts are
known to some one mind, and that it is possible to construct from
this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order."' 13 1 The
problem with constructivism, and the made order it leads to, is that it
stifles progress because it lacks the ability to adapt to the
unforeseeable.132 Hayek's central thesis is that,
a condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use their
knowledge for their purposes, restrained only by rules of
just conduct of universal application, is likely to produce for
them the best conditions for achieving their aims; and that
such a system is likely to be achieved and maintained only
if all authority, including that of the majority of the people,
is limited in the exercise of coercive power by general
principles to which the community has committed itself.'33
Legislation is inherently inimical to that objective. Only the
common law, with its ability to respond spontaneously to unforeseen
circumstances and its natural resistance to broad impingements on
personal liberty, can produce the conditions for free societal growth
and development. 1
34
Hayek's is a philosophical argument in favor of the common law
over legislation. He was concerned about the tendency of legislation
to lead increasingly to totalitarianism. Guido Calabresi has also
argued against the encroachment of legislation on the common law,
but in more pragmatic terms. In A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes, Calabresi decried what he labeled the "statutorification" of
American law.135 He argued that the legal system is choking on
statutes that have become obsolete and could not be reenacted, but
that cannot be repealed because of legislative inertia. 136 Old statutes,
in his view, have no greater claim to legitimacy than old cases.
Whether or not they are entitled to current respect depends on
whether they would command majoritarian support today.1
37
Calabresi's solution to this problem was to allow courts to treat
131. 1 id. at 14.
132. 1 id. at 54.
133. 1 id. at 55.
134. See 1 id. at 85-88.
135. CALABRESI, supra note 10.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id. at 102-03.
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statutes much like common-law precedents-as starting points from
which deviations could be made as circumstances required.138 In
other words, he would treat all statutes as if they were part of a true
perpetual index code. 139 Unfortunately, courts do not seem to have
the inclination to operate that way, even for codes that were intended
as perpetual index codes. 140  As a practical matter, Calabresi's
solution has little chance of success. Still, his focus on the problem
is instructive. He makes a persuasive case for why we should
generally favor common-law development over legislation.
Legislation's claim of legitimacy is based on a presumption of
majoritarian support at the time of its passage. Of course, public
choice theory teaches us to doubt that premise.' 4 1 But even if we
assume majoritarian support at passage, we cannot assume that
legislation retains that same support over time. Because of
legislative inertia, legislatures rarely repeal laws, even when laws
have become hopelessly out of step with current social values.
142
While judges are not subject to the same immediate majoritarian
pressures, over time they are likely to produce rules consistent with
the desires of the majority.143 Calabresi explains:
If a judge cannot find guiding principles or willfully ignores
them, it is not the end of the world. On what basis would
such a judge decide the case? If he or she responded to a
delayed majoritarianism or to a guess about today's popular
desires, we might say that other institutions would have
guessed better, but we would not for all that have an absurd
starting point. If, instead, judges sought to do what they
thought was right for society, we might be concerned with
their capacity to make that judgment, but again there would
be limits to our concern. One judge's views would win out
only if enough other judges either found that they
conformed to the legal landscape or, finding no adequate
guidelines in the landscape, still shared the judge's guess of
138. Id. at 82.
139. See id. at 83 (equating Calabresi's suggested doctrine with John Norton
Pomeroy's proposal for interpreting California's version of the Field Code).
140. Id. at 84.
141. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5.
142. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 59-90.
143. Id. at 100.
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what the majority wanted or of what was right for the
country. 144
So the common law is not just better at keeping the law up to date; it
may also better reflect democratic values over the long term.
In sum, there are at least three powerful reasons to hold a bias in
favor of the common law; to, in other words, demand that any
proposed legislation be justified in terms of its impact on the
common law. First, as a matter of simple historical choice, we have
rejected comprehensive codification as the basis of our legal
system. 145 We have made a societal decision to retain the common
law as the default position, and thus to put the burden of persuasion
on those promoting legislation. Second, we have good reason to be
skeptical of the ability of legislation to promote the public good,
because of the inherent limits of human knowledge. 146  Order
imposed by legislation is likely to be more restrictive of liberty and
less conducive to growth and development than order arising
organically from the common law. Finally, because of legislative
inertia, it is the irresistible tendency of legislation to become obsolete
and, eventually, undemocratic. 147  While the common law may
appear to have an inferior democratic pedigree, in fact, it is likely to
better reflect society's desires over time.
B. The Standards for Legislation
Common-law jurists and scholars have been suggesting
boundaries for the proper scope of legislation for centuries.
Frequently, these suggestions appear as rules of statutory
interpretation. In the most famous early example, the sixteenth
century Heydon's Case, Lord Coke laid down these rules for
statutory construction:
[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in
general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging
of the common law,) four things are to be discerned and
considered:
,144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Story, supra note 110, at 26-44 (discussing the genesis of
common law in the United States and the impracticability and undesirability of
comprehensive codification of Massachusetts common law).
146. 1 HAYEK, supra note 126.
147. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 59-90.
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1st. What was the common law before the making of the
Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the
common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and
appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office
of all the Judges is always to make such construction as
shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of
the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent
of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.1
48
In other words, under Coke's "mischief rule," all legislation must be
understood in light of its common-law antecedents, and must not be
allowed to intrude unnecessarily on common-law principles. Its
application must be limited to the mischief the legislature sought to
address. By implication, the legislature should act only where there
is some clear mischief that the common law has failed to address.
Blackstone took Coke's "mischief rule" as his starting point in
discussing the objectives of legislation. He divided statutes into two
categories: those that are "declarative" of the common law and those
that are "remedial" of some defects therein. 149 Declarative statutes
arise where the "old custom of the kingdom is almost fallen into
disuse, or become disputable," in which case parliament acts to
"declare what the common law is and ever [has] been."' 5 Remedial
statutes, on the other hand, redress "such defects, and abridge such
superfluities, in the common law, as arise either from the general
imperfection of all human laws, from change of time and
circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised determinations of
judges, or from any other cause whatsoever."' 5'1 Remedial statutes
fall into two different types. Statutes that "enlarge" the common law
provide a legal rule to govern an area not sufficiently addressed by
148. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584) (footnotes omitted).
149. See 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 63 (Wayne Morrison ed. 2001).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 64.
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the common law.152 Those that "restrain" the common law bring
under legislative control areas of the law that, in Blackstone's words,
have become "too lax and luxuriant."'
153
Max Radin, writing in the mid-twentieth century about the
functions of legislation in Blackstone's time, described a similar
classification scheme. 54  He referred to three types of statutes
instead of two. His first category, of statutes "declaring, restating,
and emphasizing" the common law, 155 seems coterminous with
Blackstone's first category. His second and third categories appear
to correspond roughly to the subdivisions of Blackstone's remedial
category. The second encompasses statutes "supplementing" the
common law, and the third covers statutes "correcting" the common
law. 1
56
The dichotomy among remedial statutes posited by Blackstone
and Radin does not hold up well to scrutiny. To take an example
familiar to evidence scholars, does a rape shield statute "enlarge" the
common law or "restrain" it? Does it "supplement" the common law
or "correct" it? The answer would seem to depend on one's
perspective. It probably makes more sense to think of two types of
legislation: legislation that simply restates the common law and
legislation that changes the common law.
Hayek, however, would not even go that far. He was too fearful
of the overreaching legislator to condone legislation intended to
declare the abstract rules already established by common law. 157 He
did concede, however, that legislation was sometimes necessary to
correct the inevitable errors in the common law. 158 First, he noted
that common-law evolution can sometimes lead to "an impasse from
which it cannot extricate itself by its own forces or which it will at
least not correct quickly enough.' ' 159 Bad law can result. Because of
the need for judges to uphold reasonable expectations by adhering to
precedent, legislation will sometimes be the only way out of such an
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REv. 388 (1942).
155. Id. at 390.
156. Id.
157. See 1 HAYEK, supra note 126, at 87-88.
158. 1 id. at 88.
159. lid.
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impasse. 6
0
Bad law might also result from two other causes. First, the
common law might simply fail to keep up with changing social
needs. "[T]he process of judicial development of law is of necessity
gradual and may prove too slow to bring about the desirable rapid
adaptation of the law to wholly new circumstances."' 61 Second, the
common law could be captured by certain interests or classes. In
Hayek's words, bad law has resulted where "the development of the
law has lain in the hands of members of a particular class whose
traditional views made them regard as just what could not meet the
more general requirements of justice."' 62 . He cited as examples the
law of master and servant, landlord and tenant, debtor and creditor,
and consumer law.1
63
Notwithstanding Hayek's reservations, it seems clear that there
are two types of justified legislation. First, legislation can serve an
ordering function. Legislation in the service of the ordering function
declares the common law so that all are put on notice as to what rules
govern in a particular area. Second, legislation can serve a remedial
function. Legislation in the service of the remedial function changes
the common law. The changes might be necessary because of simple
judicial errors, because society has changed faster than the law, or
because the common law has been captured by certain interests or
classes. 164
Simply announcing that a statute is intended to serve one of
these functions does not suffice to justify it. The common law must
actually need ordering or remedying for legislation invoking these
functions to be warranted. I turn next to the circumstances that
warrant either ordering legislation or remedial legislation.
1. The Ordering Function
The common law's advantage in flexibility comes with a cost in
160. 1 id. Legislation avoids the problem of upsetting reasonable expecta-
tions because it is declared publicly before it is applied. 1 id. at 89.
161. 1 id. at 88.
162. 1 id. at 89. Law and economics scholars have also conceded the need
for legislation in such cases, which they describe as cases of "market failure."
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367-70 (4th ed.
1992).
163. 1 HAYEK, supra note 126, at 89.
164. See l id. at 88-89.
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opacity and ambiguity. As proponents of codification have long
emphasized, case-generated legal rules can be difficult to ascertain
and inconsistent with one another. 165 Where citizens need clear
guidance as to the legal consequences of their actions, those
drawbacks can become unbearable, and legislative intervention
necessary. 166 That kind of legislative intervention serves the function
of helping to order society by providing clear standards of conduct.
Whether legislative intervention is necessary to serve the
ordering function depends on two variables. The first variable
involves the subject matter of the proposed legislation. For certain
areas of the law, concerns about either efficiency or justice dictate
that citizens know in advance the legal consequences of their actions.
The best examples are commercial law and criminal law. In
commercial law, the existence of clear rules helps minimize disputes
and therefore encourages bargaining and trade. In criminal law, the
existence of clear rules gives citizens fair notice of the kinds of
conduct that will trigger the imposition of sanctions by the state.
The subject matter is a particularly important variable where
either the stakes are high-as in criminal law--or the governing law
does not track a pre-existing social norm. 'In the area of contracts,
for example, there is not a clear social norm that would tell a
commercial actor what extent of nonconformity justifies rejection of
goods tendered under a contract. The U.C.C.'s "perfect tender rule"
resolves the dilemma by providing that any nonconformity justifies
rejection. 167 In the law of torts, on the other hand, pre-existing social
norms dictate that people should not intentionally hurt others, make
intentional misrepresentations, or act unreasonably. For this reason,
a code is largely unnecessary for the law of torts, though one is
invaluable for commercial law.
168
The second variable, which I touched on above in discussing the
value of legal certainty, involves the cost of procuring authoritative
165. See I id. at 88.
166. See I id. at 88-89.
167. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-601, lB U.L.A. 6 (1989).
168. Of course, legislation in the service of the ordering function has its
place in the law governing non-commercial interpersonal relations. While it is
sufficient in many circumstances to direct people to act reasonably, that
instruction would not help people decide which side of the road to drive on.
Arbitrary rules such as that one need legislative intervention.
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decisions on disputed legal issues. 169  Whenever law must be
interpreted at a remove from its point of enforcement, problems of
unclear and ambiguous legal rules will be exacerbated. Most law
governing the actions of people in society-in other words, most
law-fits that description. The only way to get a definitive ruling
spelling out the legal consequences of private conduct is to initiate
litigation, a prohibitively expensive prospect under most
circumstances. The value of clear rules, which, of course, may or
may not result from codification, is increased in those cases.
So where the stated goal of enacted law is to bring coherence,
clarity, and transparency to a doctrinal area-where codification is
intended to serve the ordering function-we should expect to see a
measurable benefit tied to efficiency or justice and the area of the
law should be one in which case-by-case resolution of disputed
issues is impracticable.
2. The Remedial Function
Legislation undertaken in the service of the ordering function
presupposes that pre-code law, or at least some incarnation of it, is
meeting society's needs. The objective of the legislator is to make
the law apparent so that everyone may be more easily guided by it.
Legislation in the service of the remedial function assumes that the
common law is failing to meet the needs of society.170 When used
legitimately, it is the means by which legislatures correct conflicts
between the common law and prevailing social norms.
Probably the best examples of large-scale remedial legislation
come from the law of torts. 171 After a long lag, the common law of
torts ultimately caught up to modem realities in dealing with the
relationship between producers and consumers. 172  Common-law
rules dealing with privity had operated for decades to deny recovery
to remote consumers injured by defective products. 173  Courts
ultimately recognized that those limits on liability were not
169. See supra Part II.A.2.
170. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 149, at 63.
171. See generally HARRY W. JONES ET AL., LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND
TEXT MATERIALS 132-217 (1980) (presenting cases showing the evolution of
"the law relating to a manufacturer's liability for damages caused by its
products").
172. See id.
173. See id. at 138-209.
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sustainable in a modem commercial economy. The courts changed
the law accordingly; the common law worked as it should.
17 4
The law failed, however, to evolve quickly enough to keep up
with changing social norms regarding the relationships between
employers and employees and between industrial producers and the
public. 175 As to the former, the law governing the feudal master-
servant relationship was assumed to govern all employer-employee
relationships, with the consequence that employees had little
recourse when they were injured at work. 17 6 As to the latter, courts
relied on the law of nuisance to determine when an industrial polluter
was subject to civil liability. 177  Because of collective action
problems, the victims of industrial pollution were unable to use the
courts effectively to protect themselves, and the wealthy polluters
were able to mold the common law to their advantage.1
78
These disparities between the needs of the members of modem
society and the redress provided by the common law were filled
through legislation. 179 Congressional legislation establishing wage
and hour standards' 80 and providing for safe and healthful working
conditions addressed the worst inequities of the employer-employee
relationship.' 18 Later, both state governments and Congress enacted
legislation to address the growing public outcry against
discrimination in the workplace. 182  The federal government
eventually set up a comprehensive legislative and regulatory scheme
to address the problem of industrial pollution.' 83 Enacted law thus
174. Id. at 132-217.
175. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the
Law of Industrial Accidents, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 269, 270 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry
N. Scheiber eds., 1978).
176. See id.
177. See generally Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial
Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974) (discussing the history of nuisance
law).
178. See Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
205,218-19 (1982).
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
181. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§651-678
(2000).
182. See, e.g., Equal Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e1-17 (2000).
183. See, e.g., Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000); Water Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean
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changed each of these important relationships by supplanting
common-law legal standards that had become obsolete.1
8 4
The key to assessing legislation undertaken in the service of the
remedial function is the size and persistence of the gap between what
society demands and what the common law provides. Again, the
value of the common-law system lies in its flexibility. In many
contexts, the common law has successfully evolved to account for
social changes. In the law relating to products liability, judge-made
law adapted quickly enough to meet society's needs.18 5  Where
common-law evolution is working, legislatures should refrain from
acting. But where courts have repeatedly -or conclusively refused to
act despite mounting social agitation for change, legislation in the
service of the remedial function is appropriate.
8 6
IV. APPLYING THE STANDARDS FOR LEGISLATION TO THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE
In Part II above, I discussed in general terms why the traditional
arguments for codification lack force when applied in the evidence
context. In this Part, I delve into the rules in more detail to
determine the extent to which evidence codification is justified under
the standards for legislation just described in Part III. I discuss the
Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000); see also, Blake A. Watson, Liberal
Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the
Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199,
261 nn.260-263 (1996) (citing cases in which courts referred to environmental
legislation as "remedial").
184. Still, some common law supporters argue that environmental concerns
would be better addressed through case law. See, e.g., Roger E. Meiners &
Bruce Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PUB. CHOICE 49 (1998);
H. Marlow Green, Note, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment:
A Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and
England and a Model for the Future, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 541 (1997); Todd
J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common
Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions
to Large-Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 961 (1996).
185. See supra text accompanying note 171.
186. Divorce law is a good example. Until 1970, when California enacted
the first no-fault divorce law, courts in every state required a showing of one
party's "guilt." See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 6-10,
15 (1985). By 1980, all but two states had adopted some form of no-fault
divorce law. Id. at 20.
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rules that are currently codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence
first. The most important of these are the rules covering judicial
notice, character evidence, the policy-based relevancy rules in
Article 4, competency, expert testimony and opinion evidence,
hearsay, authentication, and the "best evidence" rule. I then turn to
the uncodified rules, with by far the most important being the rules
on privilege.
For each rule considered, I will analyze whether codification of
the rule is justified under either the ordering or remedial function. In
addressing the ordering function, I will evaluate the subject matter, to
assess whether the rule impacts an area in which efficiency or justice
concerns are implicated, and the extent to which case-by-case
resolution of contested issues is practicable. In addressing the
remedial function, I will try to assess the extent to which the
common-law failed to keep pace with changing social and legal
norms.
A. The Codified Rules
Most of the codified rules of evidence enacted versions of the
law prevailing at common law.' 8 7 They did not change the law. For
those rules, the justification must lie in the ordering function. For the
rules that did change the law, the justification must lie in the
remedial function.
1. Justification Under the Ordering Function
Whether the law warrants legislative intervention in the service
of the ordering function depends on the subject matter in question
and on whether case-by-case resolution without legislation is
impracticable. As to subject matter, the central inquiry is whether
concerns about efficiency and/or justice rise to a sufficient level to
warrant legislation.
Efficiency concerns may justify legislation in the service of the
ordering function when the existence of clear, codified rules would
significantly reduce transaction costs by allowing people to know
ahead of time the rules that govern their behavior. 1 8  Because most
rules of evidence simply govern how lawyers prepare for trial, the
187. See Rosen, supra note 34, at 1123-24.
188. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW (1988).
Winter 2004]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:809
main costs associated with inefficiencies in the law of evidence will
be litigation costs.' 89 At least in civil cases, most litigation costs are
concentrated in the pre-trial stage, during which the parties gather
evidence and use discovery to identify the other side's evidence. The
rest of the cost is tied to the actual trial and any appeals. The rules of
evidence could affect costs at both points, because admissibility
determines the evidence that has to be gathered and discovered as
well as the evidence that is actually introduced.
For most aspects of evidence law, the actual costs of uncertainty
in the rules will be quite low. Take the rules governing character
evidence and hearsay as an example. 190 Arguably these are the most
important rules of evidence, at least if importance is measured in
terms of space taken up in the rules, legal disputes generated, and
time spent in discussions in law school evidence courses. Character
evidence involves the personal characteristics and behaviors of
people who had a hand in the events giving rise to the dispute at bar
or who have knowledge about those events. 19' Hearsay involves out-
of-court statements having relevance to the events in dispute. 192 For
purposes of pre-trial litigation, parties have incentives to search out
both kinds of evidence and to generate theories of relevance and
admissibility for what they find. Even if the possibilities for
admissibility initially seem slight, the. parties will go through that
process because the admissibility calculus can change depending on
the other evidence admitted. Another party may open the door to
character evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. 193 And
evidence that was hearsay for one purpose might become relevant for
a non-hearsay purpose as the facts of the case develop. Thus, for
189. See Berger, supra note 45, at 264-69.
190. For character evidence, see FED R. Evin. 404-415; for hearsay, see
FED. R. EviD. 801-807.
191. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, WEISSENBERGER'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.3, at 97 (2001) ("The term 'character' refers to a
generalized description of a person's disposition or a general trait such as
honesty, temperance or peacefulness.").
192. See FED. R. EviD. 801(a)-(c). Obviously, not all relevant, out-of-court
statements are hearsay. But all are subject to hearsay analysis to determine
whether they are hearsay and, if so, whether they are admissible.
193. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 4.12, at 187 ("[I]f [an
accused] gives an opinion on his own character or tries to present a portrait of
himself as an honest or law-abiding or peaceful person, most courts properly
admit rebuttal evidence offered by the prosecution.").
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costs associated with pre-trial fact development, the existence of
clear, codified rules on character evidence and hearsay will have
little or no effect. The same is true for most other rules, including
those governing authentication, the "best evidence" rule, and the
rules on judicial notice. 194 For all these rules, the parties will likely
expend the same resources preparing for trial whether or not clear,
codified rules exist.
In some cases, serious questions may arise about the
admissibility of evidence that could have a significant impact on pre-
trial litigation costs. The admissibility of expert testimony is
probably the best example. Parties spend large sums of money
locating and educating experts, compiling expert reports, taking and
defending expert depositions, and preparing experts for trial. If an
expert's testimony is not admitted, the money spent in that process
for that expert is wasted. Codified rules on expert testimony might
make it easier for parties to assess the likely admissibility of an
expert's testimony and so to reduce that possibility.' 95 Or they might
not. The rules as currently codified add little to the test set out by the
Supreme Court, suggesting that common-law development would
have done just as well. 196 More importantly, however, to the extent a
party has a serious question about the admissibility of an expert's
testimony, that issue can be resolved by way of a pre-trial motion.
Pre-trial motions are not free, but they are relatively inexpensive as a
share of the total cost of litigation, and their cost may be well worth
194. See FED. R. EvID. 201, 901, 1003.
195. But see Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices,
and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials,
8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 309, 310 (2002) (discussing a Federal Judicial
Center study of attorneys in 1000 federal civil cases prior to amendment of
Rule 702 showing that most attorneys did not believe that problems relating to
discovery involving expert witnesses significantly affected litigation costs).
196. See WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 191, § 702.4, at 367-71
(explaining Daubert, Kumho, and Rule 702's codification of their holdings).
Rule 702 adds little because its language is even more general than the
language in Daubert and Kumho, leaving courts no choice but to rely on the
cases for guidance. And to the extent the rule has been understood to change
the holdings of the cases, it has been criticized for making the test of reliability
more difficult to apply. See Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness
Predicament: Determining "Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert,
Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 347-51 (2000) (criticizing the three-part test of
reliability in Rule 702 for confusing the holding of Kumho).
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the increased value of having flexible common-law rules rather than
stiff codified rules.
The other major source of litigation costs is trial itself. The
existence of clear, codified rules of evidence could reduce the costs
of trial by reducing the amount of time the parties and the judge need
to research, argue, and decide evidentiary issues. Again, however,
that cost seems minor. Judges and experienced trial attorneys learn
the arguments for and against admissibility for the vast majority of
evidence issues and seldom resort to the rules at all. For novice
attorneys and for particularly difficult issues, many good treatises
now exist, and existed before codification. In most cases, because
the judge is always present and available to rule on disputed
evidence questions, the trial-related efficiency gains from
codification are likely to be miniscule for all aspects of evidence law.
In the absence of codified rules, the judge's decisions may be
misguided, but they will not be less efficient merely because they are
based on codified law.
In comparison to other substantive areas of law, the need for
codification for evidence rules is relatively low, because the cost of a
judicial resolution of a disputed issue is relatively low. Again, these
issues arise during the course of litigation, and very often during the
course of trial itself. A judge is either on hand or available through a
motion process. So uncertainty in the rules will not carry the same
costs that it would in, say, the commercial law context.
A handful of the codified rules affect "primary" conduct, that is,
real-world conduct rather than conduct in the course of litigation.
These are the rules in Article 4 designed to effectuate certain public
policies through exclusionary rules of evidence. 197 For these rules,
the need for codification is increased because the rules must be
interpreted and applied by private actors in the world outside of
litigation.
Rule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures
197. See, e.g., John R. Schmertz, Jr., Relevance and Its Policy
Counterweights: A Brief Excursion Through Article IV of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 1 (1974) (identifying limitations on
the introduction of certain behavior as an admission of liability in Rules 407-
410 as the result of "policy considerations thought to outweigh the relevancy
of such evidence").
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undertaken to address injury-causing conditions.' 98 Its purpose is to
remove any evidence-related disincentive to fix dangerous
conditions.' 99 The rule is designed to affect the conduct not just of
individuals, but also of commercial actors whose products injure
others.20 0 Those actors may face liability in many jurisdictions for
the same defective product. To the extent the policy behind Rule
407 has validity, it cannot work unless a commercial actor knows
that the protection for subsequent remedial measures applies in all, or
almost all, of the jurisdictions in which suit might be brought.
Rule 408 excludes evidence of settlement negotiations in civil
cases 20 1 and Rule 410 excludes evidence of plea negotiations that do
not end in a guilty plea.20 2 Settlement and plea negotiations can take
place before the initiation of formal proceedings. In such a case, the
uniformity provided by codification would help encourage settlement
by providing assurance that a particular level of protection would
apply no matter where suit is ultimately brought. In the vast majority
of cases, however, the parties to a settlement negotiation either are
already involved in formal litigation or know where formal litigation
would take place.
For Rules 408 and 410, the main benefit of codification is
clarity. The purpose of these rules is to encourage compromise
instead of trial in civil and criminal cases by removing the possibility
that compromise negotiations will be used as evidence of an
admission of liability or guilt.20 3 If litigants are uncertain of the
degree of protection their statements will receive, they will say as
little as possible. Uncertainty would undermine the purposes of the
198. FED. R. EvID. 407.
199. See id. advisory committee's note ("The [principal] ground for
exclusion rests on a social policy of... not discouraging [people] from taking
steps in furtherance of added safety.").
200. This was not always clear. Debates grew up around the original version
of the rule as to whether it applied to measures undertaken subsequent to
injuries resulting from defective products. These debates were resolved in a
1997 amendment that made clear that the rule applies in product liability cases.
See id. advisory committee's note to 1997 amendment.
201. See FED. R. EvID. 408.
202. See FED. R. EvID. 410(4).
203. See FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EvID. 410
advisory committee's note.
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rule.
204
To varying degrees, then, codification in the service of the
ordering function is justified for these rules on an efficiency
rationale. In addition to concerns about efficiency, though, concerns
about justice might also warrant legislation in the service of the
ordering function. We codify criminal law because we want to
ensure that everyone has fair notice of the behaviors that can trigger
a punitive response from the state.20 5 Because the rules of evidence
govern the process through which criminal defendants are tried and
convicted, the same rationale could be applied to them.
Again, though, these concerns seem relatively inconsequential
for most areas of evidence law that have been codified. Whereas
potential miscreants in society typically do not have a lawyer on
hand when deciding whether to engage in anti-social conduct,
defendants charged with relatively serious crimes always have access
to legal counsel during the prosecution.20 6 Virtually all criminal
defendants accept public legal assistance or hire a private attorney.
°7
Those that do not have made a choice to swim the waters of the legal
system alone. Complaints these defendants might make about the
difficulties of understanding the hearsay rule, navigating the
character rules, and laying evidentiary foundations would ring
comparatively hollow.
Furthermore, none of the codified rules that deal exclusively or
primarily with criminal proceedings impact primary conduct-
conduct outside the context of litigation. The rules deal with conduct
204. I leave aside FED. R. EVID., which excludes evidence of offers to pay
medical expenses occasioned by an injury. Its purpose is to encourage offers
to help others without imputing liability, and it could not serve that purpose
unless it is both widely known and uniform. See FED. R. EviD. 409 advisory
committee's note. Codification would perhaps be justified on that basis,
except that the rule seems so unlikely to have any effect on anyone's actual
behavior, whether codified or not.
205. See CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 78-79.
206. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (holding that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that counsel be provided for
indigent criminal defendants in state, as well as federal prosecutions).
207. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
(2000) (reporting that only 0.4% of felony defendants represented themselves
in the largest seventy-five U.S. counties in 1996, and only 0.3% of felony
defendants represented themselves in federal court in 1998), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/dccc.pdf.
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at trial or in the pre-trial stage at which the commencement of formal
proceedings has already been contemplated, if not initiated. Even if
these rules lack clarity, a judge is usually close at hand to resolve
disputes. Case-by-case resolution of disputed issues is seldom
impracticable.
Probably the best case for codification on a justice rationale can
be made for Rule 410, excluding evidence of plea negotiations.
208
Many suspects face an initial round of dialogue with a prosecuting
attorney without counsel. To be sure, under Miranda 
v. Arizona,20 9
those suspects must be made aware of their right to counsel, 21
0 but
they are much less likely to insist on counsel than is a charged
defendant facing a trial. Fairness suggests that clear and accessible
rules should exist disclosing the protection-and more importantly,
the lack of protection-afforded the statements they make to
211prosecutors in those meetings.
2. Justification Under the Remedial Function
For codification to be justified under the remedial function, a
persistent and relatively significant disparity must have existed
between the common-law rule and evolving social or legal 
norms.2 12
Several codified rules address areas that seem to meet that standard.
Others purportedly needed to remedy problems in the judge-made
law do not.
Examples of rules that made valuable and probably necessary
changes to common-law practice include Rule 607,213 Rule 613,214
Rule 704,215 Rules 803(6)216 and 902(1 1),217 and Rule 
1003.218
208. See FED. R. EvID. 410.
209. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
210. See id. at 444.
211. See FED. R. EvID. 410(4). Statements made in connection with plea
discussions that result in a guilty plea, for example, are not protected.
212. See 1 HAYEK, supra note 126, at 88.
213. FED. R. Evil. 607 (eliminating the "voucher rule").
214. FED. R. EvID. 613 (simplifying use of prior inconsistent statements to
impeach).
215. FED. R. EvID. 704 (allowing opinions on the "ultimate issue").
216. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
217. FED. R. EvmD. 902(11) (simplifying the introduction of business
records).
218. FED. R. EvID. 1003 (allowing duplicates to be used just like originals
for purposes of the best evidence rule).
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These are all relatively technical improvements in the way trials are
handled. Although technical, the problems they addressed persisted
over many years despite steady commentary advocating change.
2 19
These problems were examples, as Hayek described, of the common
law working itself into comers from which it could not emerge.
220
Legislation was needed, and the codified rules have served well to
rectify the problems they addressed.
A more significant remedial measure is Rule 412, widely known
as the federal rape shield statute.221 Rule 412 limits the introduction,
in a civil or criminal case involving alleged sexual misconduct, of
evidence of the victim's prior sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition.222 It overturns the long-standing defense practice in
rape cases of attempting to show consent by showing the victim's
predisposition to have sex. 22 3 That practice was rightly criticized for
"putting the victim on trial," but judges seemed unwilling to address
it.224 Rule 412, and, more importantly, the state rape shield laws on
which it was based, represent an overdue attempt to rectify this
serious and persistent defect in the common law of evidence.
225
If remedial legislation was necessary in those areas and has been
relatively successful in practice, in other areas remedial legislation
has clearly been a mistake. Rule 804(b)(3), which extends the
219. See FED. R. EvID. 607 advisory committee's notes, 613 advisory
committee's notes, 704 advisory committee's notes.
220. See 1 HAYEK, supra note 126, at 88.
221. See WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 191, § 412.1, at 172.
222. See FED. R. Evil. 412.
223. See Ann Althouse, Themla and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield
Rules Matter?, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 757, 760 (1992) ("The defense
commonly adopted tie strategy of casting doubt on her characterization of the
event in question by encouraging the jury to infer that if the victim had
consented to sexual activity in the past it is more likely that she consented on
this occasion as well.").
224. See id. at 760-61 (stating that although judges should have excluded
most evidence of a victims past sexual behavior even before the advent of a
rape shield law, their own prejudices and misconceptions prevented an
objective treatment of such evidence).
225. See id. at 765 ("Rape shield rules... convey a strong message to judges
that many persons who have considered the relevance of past sexual behavior
have reached the conclusion embodied in the rape shield rule."). Despite the
value of rape shield statutes as statements of public policy, Professor Althouse
questions the extent to which rape shield statutes can actually change the
behavior ofjudges. Id. at 766.
A LEGISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
traditional hearsay exception for statements against pecuniary and
propriety interests to statements against penal interest, is one
important example. The Advisory Committee explained that the
extension of the exception to statements against penal interest simply
took the exception to its "full logical limit.' 226 It saw the only real
problem with an against-penal-interest exception as the risk that
defendants might fabricate statements by third persons that implicate
the third person and thereby exculpate the defendant. 227 In practice,
the rule has proved problematic not when used to admit statements
exculpating a defendant, but when used to admit statements
inculpating a defendant. 228 Despite the Supreme Court's efforts to
ensure that only a declarant's statements that are truly inculpatory
when made fit within the rule,229 courts have used the rule to admit
an unjustifiably broad range of statements loosely considered
"inculpatory." 23 °  The result has been an erosion of defendants'
rights to confront their accusers. This is an instance in which the
common law may not have been as illogical as it seemed.
Another example of misguided remedial legislation is the set of
rules allowing evidence of a defendant's propensity to engage in
sexual acts in cases alleging sexual misconduct.231 These rules,
enacted by Congress over widespread opposition,232 purport to
change the common-law proscription against the introduction of
evidence of the defendant's character by the prosecution in its case-
226. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
227. Id. The rule includes a requirement of corroboration for statements
against penal interest used to exculpate a defendant to address concerns about
the reliability of such statements. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
228. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 8.75 at 943-44.
229. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994).
230. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 8.75, at 943 n.15
(citing several cases that use an expansive definition of inculpatory).
231. See FED. R. EviD. 413-415.
232. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN
CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995) (discussing the nearly
unanimous opposition to Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 from judges,
lawyers, law professors, legal organizations, the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules, and the Judicial Conference itself), reprinted in 159 F.R.D.
51, 52-54 (1995).
Winter 2004]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:809
in-chief.233 They suffer from several defects. First, they were poorly
drafted, leading to much unnecessary litigation about basic issues,
such as whether evidence of sexual predisposition can be excluded as
unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. Second, they increase the risk
of false convictions and weaken the presumption of innocence by
raising the possibility that defendants might be convicted on the basis
of past behavior rather than evidence of the charged offense.
235
Finally, Congress had no empirical grounds for concluding that
propensity evidence is more probative in sex offense cases than other
cases or that highly probative evidence was being routinely excluded
in those cases. In short, this "remedial" legislation did not even
address a genuine problem and was deeply flawed in its execution.
The law should have been left in the hands of judges.
B. The Uncodified Rules
Evidence law in the federal courts includes a handful of rules or
standards governing the admission of evidence at trial that are simply
not mentioned in the rules. For example, longstanding custom
disallows tactics such as the argumentative question, the question
that assumes facts not in evidence, and the "asked and answered"
question. 2 37 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not mention these
objections. In addition, one type of evidence that comes up
frequently at trial but that is not expressly covered by the rules is
impeachment through the demonstration of bias.238 It is arguably
"covered" by Rule 611, which leaves the judge with broad discretion
233. See id. (stating that Rules 413 and 414 provide that evidence of prior
sex acts may be "considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant").
234. See James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior
Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea,
157 F.R.D. 95, 118-19 (1994).
235. See Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New
Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 57, 73-74 (1995).
236. See Duane, supra note 234, at 97-99.
237. See MUELLER & KRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 6.56, at 568-70
(explaining that Federal Rule 611 merely gives judges discretion to control the
questioning of witnesses, but does not bar specific forms of questions).
238. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (recognizing
demonstration of witness's bias as a "permissible and established basis of
impeachment" under the federal rules even though no rule expressly condones
it).
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to regulate matters in the courtroom. 2 39 But it is not "codified" in
any meaningful sense.
For the same reasons that most rules of admissibility-such as
the rules addressing hearsay and character evidence-do not warrant
codification, these customary rules are better left to case-by-case
development. The rules affect only the behavior of attorneys and
litigants during trial. When questions involving them arise, a judge
is present to answer them, negating efficiency concerns. And while
in a perfectly just world all judges would rule the same way on
objections about the form of questions, minor differences in the
formalities of courtroom procedure seldom raise serious concerns
about either efficiency or justice. Remedial legislation might be
needed if the rules were not functioning properly, but there is no
reason to think these are matters on which judges have gone
irretrievably off course.
240
If these unmentioned customary rules are essentially trivial, the
one area of evidence law that has been expressly designated for
common-law development is far from trivial. That is the law
governing privilege,2 4N the focal point of this symposium. Privilege
law was left uncodified not because of any legisprudential
determination that it was better suited to case-by-case evolution, but
because of political considerations. 242  Interest groups have
incentives to seek privileges protecting relationships in which they
are involved and to oppose privileges protecting the relationships of
their adversaries. The proposed privilege rules provoked intense
239. See FED. R. EviD. 611 (a); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 46, § 6.56, at 567 ("The court has discretion to control the mode of
questioning witnesses under FRE 611 .... ").
240. One uncodified problem area I have identified elsewhere is the judicial
certification of expert witnesses. See Paul F. Kirgis, Curtailing the Judicial
Certification of Expert Witnesses, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 347 (2000). There
is no good reason for judges to insert themselves into the witness credibility
calculus by declaring on the record that a witness is an "expert." Witnesses
who have been shown to have the necessary qualifications to testify to
specialized matters should simply be allowed to testify. Yet many judges
believe they are required to state expressly their conclusion that a witness has
been qualified as an expert. This practice has persisted long enough that
legislative intervention might now be warranted.
241. See FED. R. EviD. 501.
242. But see Broun, supra note 6, at 775-77 (noting that some academics
opposed the proposed privilege rules on the ground that they would stifle the
development of new privileges).
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opposition among certain interest groups who felt their relationships
were not sufficiently protected while others' relationships were
inordinately protected.2 3 Rather than sort out the competing claims,
Congress rejected the proposed privilege rules as a whole and punted
privilege law to the courts.
244
Whatever the political necessities of the time may have required,
that was not a legisprudentially sound decision. Assuming that we
believe privileges are valuable and should be maintained-an
assumption I do not dispute for purposes of this article-the law of
privilege is probably the area of evidence law most in need of
legislation in the service of the ordering function. Leaving aside the
possibility that aspects of privilege law need remedial attention-a
prospect that would be as controversial today as it was in the early
1970s-efficiency and, to a lesser extent, justice concerns strongly
favor the codification of privilege law. More than any other area of
evidence law, moreover, privilege issues arise when no judge is
available to provide a quick decision.
The purpose of privilege law is to encourage free
communication in a variety of interpersonal relationships.245 The
underlying rationale may be instrumental-to secure social benefits
from free communication--or humanistic-to protect the privacy of
individuals.246 The rules protecting privileged communications from
disclosure in discovery and admission at trial work by removing a
disincentive that people might otherwise have to communicate
freely.
For privilege law to have its desired effect, people must know, at
the time they communicate, whether their communications will
receive privileged status.247 If the law is unsettled or unclear, people
are likely to err on the side of caution. They may curtail their
communications in order to avoid the possibility of a later disclosure
at trial or in pre-trial discovery. Assuming we have correctly
identified the relationships that should be privileged, social costs will
243. See id. at 776-77.
244. See id. at 777.
245. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of
Evidentiary Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the
Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 241, 248 (2002).
246. See id. at 243-44.
247. Id. at 243.
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increase as a result.
Even if the law of privilege is absolutely clear, it cannot perform
its desired functions if it is not uniform within and among
jurisdictions. If people know that their communications will be
protected in one court system to which they might be haled but not to
others, they will behave as though the communication has no
protection at all. Currently, the federal courts employ a different law
of privilege than their state counterparts248 and do not even conform
to a single standard among each other. For example, splits among
the circuits exist with regard to important questions such as whether
communications between corporate officers and corporate counsel
are protected by the attorney-client privilege in an action brought by
shareholders,24 whether the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege applies to intentional torts other than fraud,250 and
whether a qualified journalist's privilege applies to non-confidential
material. 251  Again assuming we have correctly identified the
relationships to be protected, this lack of uniformity, like a lack of
certainty, will increase social costs.
Justice concerns also play a role in the consideration of privilege
law, particularly with respect to the attorney-client privilege. The
existence of the attorney-client privilege is an essential ingredient in
assuring criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of
counsel.252 To the extent different courts provide different degrees
248. The most notable difference between federal and state privilege law
involves the physician-patient privilege. Most states have a codified
physician-patient privilege applicable in state courts and in federal courts
where state law supplies the rule of decision. See Broun, supra note 6, at 807
(noting that forty states have codified the physician-patient privilege). The
Supreme Court implicitly rejected a federal general physician-patient privilege
in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), in which the Court recognized a
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
249. See Broun, supra note 6, at 786-87.
250. See id. at 787.
251. See Anthony L. Fargo, Reconsidering the Federal Journalist's Privilege
for Non-Confidential Information: Gonzales v. NBC, 19 CARDoZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 355, 370-71 (2001).
252. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) ("[T]he Sixth
Amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee can be meaningfully
implemented only if a criminal defendant knows that his communications with
his attorney are private and that his lawful preparations for trial are secure
against intrusion by the government, his adversary in the criminal
proceeding.").
Winter 2004]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:809
of protection for attorney-client communications, for example
because of differences in the application of the crime-fraud
exception, defendants receive different treatment from the justice
system. Whereas a defendant in one jurisdiction might feel
comfortable raising an issue with his attorney, a similarly-situated
defendant in another jurisdiction might withhold the same
information from his attorney. Those differences could produce real
disparities in the representation the defendants receive.
For all privileges, those designed to foster personal
relationships, as well as those designed to foster professional
relationships, the need for codification is significantly greater than
for most other evidence rules because privilege law affects primary
conduct. We disallow the introduction into evidence of privileged
matter in order to remove a disincentive that people might otherwise
have to communicate freely outside the courtroom. In most cases, no
judge is present when a potentially privileged communication is
made. The people involved cannot easily obtain a judicial ruling on
whether the privilege applies. Consequently, case-by-case resolution
of privilege issues is impracticable.
Indeed, case-by-case resolution of privilege issues would not be
desirable even if it were practicable. Privileges exist to protect
communications that people do not want disclosed. Frequently, the
nature of the communications at issue is so sensitive that the people
involved try to avoid divulging the information even to a judge. For
privilege law to serve its desired function, people must be able to
anticipate, before making the communication and without consulting
anyone else, whether a communication will be privileged. This is yet
another reason why it is so important to make privilege rules
apparent and uniform through codification.
Of course, saying privilege law should be codified raises an
entirely new set of questions about what privileges should be
codified, what cases a codified federal law of privilege should
govern, and how the codification should be drafted. Other
commentators have addressed those topics in detail, and I will not
revisit them here.253 For my purposes, it should suffice to emphasize
that my conclusion that codified privilege rules would be justified
under the ordering function implies that the rules should have a
253. See Broun, supra note 6, at 805-12.
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broad enough scope to produce uniformity and enough detail to
produce certainty of application.
V. CONCLUSION
Because privilege law is the glaring omission from the Federal
Rules of Evidence, debates about the desirability of codifying rules
of privilege will almost certainly continue indefinitely. Codification
proponents will continue to push for the codification of privilege law
for the foreseeable future-or until they succeed. But the fact that
privilege law remains uncodified should also push us to reconsider,
from time to time, our assumptions about codification in general.
Our system is one of common law with a statutory overlay. We
have rejected comprehensive codification of our law, and there are
important normative grounds for maintaining a preference for
common law over legislation. Any proposed legislation should be
justified in relation to the common law it would displace. For most
rules of evidence, that justification simply has not been
demonstrated.
Of course, it is probably too late in the day to reverse the
codification of evidence law in general. Given the widespread
acceptance of the rules, the cost of repeal might exceed the benefits
even if repeal were politically possible. But we can use the same
legisprudential tools for evaluating evidence codification in general
to analyze the desirability of proposed expansions and revisions of
the evidence code. We can ask whether further codification is
justified either by the ordering function or the remedial function. I
suggest that we should meet most proposed additions and
amendments with skepticism. In the case of privilege law, however,
my analysis suggests that codification is justified.
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